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notify a mother of an illegitimate child of the adoption proceeding would
give grounds for setting the proceedings aside."1 But that case was tried
under the statute providing for adoption of deserted children, 1 2 and the
mother was bringing the action. So also in Lee v. Back,13 where failure to
give notice to the natural father was held to be fatal because the proceeding
was an adversary one. But here again the action was brought by a natural
parent, the father. Thus, it seems that Indiana is in accord with the great
weight of authority that an adoption proceeding will not be valid as against
the natural parents who have not abandoned their child unless they were
notified of the proceeding or have consented to it.14
The plaintiffs in this case were collateral heirs, brothers and sisters, of
the deceased adoptive mother. It has been held that presumptive heirs have
no right to attack an adoption proceeding before the death of the adoptive
parents because they have no vested rights at the time of which they can
claim to be deprived.' 5 When the adoptive parents get the decree and take
the child into their family and treat it as their child for a reasonable length
of time they are estopped to deny the validity of the proceedings by which
that child was adopted.16 This estoppel'has been extended to the presump-
tive heirs who claim through the adoptive parents and can have no better
rights than the adoptive parents had before the latter's death.17 Indiana
is in accord.18 It would seem that the heirs have no rights in such a case.
This provides the justification for the court's disregard of the mandatory
language of the statute.19
It is apparent that the Indiana court has followed the present tendency,
and although we have not gone as far as Maine, which has limited by
statute2 0 the right to attack the decree to the child by his next friend, or
the petitioner for adoption, it is submitted that the court has reached a
desirable result and on sound reasoning. D. C.
TAXATION-CONsrrUTioNALrrY OF INDIANA GROSS INCOME TAX AcT.-Ap-
pellants, as taxpayers, sought to enjoin appellees from paying out funds of
the state for the printing of Chap. 50 of the Acts of 1933, p. 388, known as
the Indiana Gross Income Tax Act, on the ground that the statute was
unconstitutional. The act places a tax on the gross income, defined as gross
receipts, of the taxpayer received as compensation for personal services and
derived from trades, business or commerce, or the sale of real or personal
property without any deductions for expenses or losses. The rate of the
tax is either 1% of such gross receipts or 1/ of 1%, depending upon the
source of the income, e. g. income from mining, manufacturing, wholesaling,
11 Glansman v. Ledbetter (1920), 190 Ind. 505, 130 N. E. 230.
12 Burns' Indiana Annotated Statutes 1933, sec. 3-112.
13 (1868), 30 Ind. 148.
14 24 A. L. R. 416 and cases there cited.
15 Gray v. Gardner (1888), 81 Me. 554, 18 AtI. 286.
16 Parsons v. Parsons (1898), 101 Wise. 76, 77 N. W 147.
17Bird v. Young (1897), 56 Ohio St. 210, 46 N. E. 819; Wolf's Appeal
(1888), 10 Sadler Pa. 139, 13 At. 760; Mullaney's Adoption (1904), 25 Pa.
Super. Ct. 259.
1 8 Brown v Brown (1885), 101 Ind. 340.
19 Burns' Indiana Annotated Statutes 1933, sec. 3-105.
20 Revised Statutes Maine (1930), C. 80, see. 30.
486
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etc., comes within the lower rate, while retail sales, receipts of utilities, and
income through professional activities are assessed at the higher rate. Every
activity is covered by one or the other of the enumerated classes. Appellants
contended that the assessments were not uniform and the rates were not
equal as to all property and thus the act was in contravention of Art. 10,
sec. 1 of the Indiana Constitution; and if the tax was deemed to be an
excise tax, the varied rate for different classifications is a denial of the
equal protection of the law and thus contrary to both state and federal con-
stitutions. Held, the tax is not a property tax and thus is not governed by
the "uniform and equal rate of assessment' clause, nor are the classifications
of the source of the income sufficiently unreasonable so as to amount to a
denial of the equal protection of the law.1
As indicated, the Gross Income Tax Act presents two problems of con-
stitutionality. (1) Is it a tax within the limitations of the "uniform and
equal rate of assessment" clause of the Indiana Constitution? 2  (2) Are its
provisions for different rates and various exceptions a denial of the equal
protection of the law? 3 The answer to the first question depends upon
whether or not the tax is a property tax, for it is generally held that only
property taxes under a general levy come within that clause.4 The instant
case holds the tax to be an excise tax and not a property tax.5 This raises
the further problem, upon what legal capacities is the tax, as an excise tax,
levied?
There has been much conflict in the denominational and categorical
classification of income taxes.6 As one writer points out, however, it is
probably undesirable to place income taxes into any particular one of the
established categories for it has some of the features of all classes but not
IMiles v. Department of Treasury (1935), 199 N. E. 372 (Ind. Sup.),
superseding opinion in 193 N. E. 855,97 A. L. R. 1474.
2 Constitution of Indiana, Art. 10, sec. 1.
3 Constitution of Indiana, Art. 1, sec. 24, Constitution of United States
Amendment 14. Altho the federal constiution reads " * * nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" and the
state constitution reads " * * shall not grant to any citizen or class of
citizens, privileges and immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not
equally belong to all citizens," the principal case and past authority deem
one provision to be the antithesis of the other. Hammer v. State (1909),
173 Ind. 199, 89 N. E. 850.
4Lutz v. Arnold (1935), 193 N. E. 840 (Ind. Sup.), holding the Intangible
Tax Law of Indiana to be not a property tax and thus not within the "uniform
and equal" clause. For the conflicting and complicating features of this
decision with respect to the distinction between a property tax and an excise
tax, see comment, 10 Ind. L. J. 450.
It is also to be noted that the court in the principal case cites the same
authority as was cited in Lutz v. Arnold, suPra, that the constitutional
limitation in question applies only to property taxes, i. e. Thomasson v. State
(1860), 15 Ind. 449; Bright v. McCullough (1866), 27 Ind. 223, Kersey v.
Terre Haute (1903), 161 Ind. 471, 68 N. E. 1027, Gafill v. Bracken (1924),
195 Ind. 551, 145 N. E. 312, 146 N. E. 109; State Board of Tax Commissioners
v. Jackson (1931), 283 U. S. 527, 73 A. L. R. 1464.
5 Miles v. Department of Treasury (1935), 199 N. E. 372, 378.
6 For various irreconc':Ilable cases, see annotations in 97 A. L. R. 1488,
71 A. L. R. 256, 70 A. L. R. 468, and 11 A. L. R. 313.
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all of the features of any one class. 7 It bears some analogy to a personal
tax.8 It bears an even closer resemblance to a property tax, z. e. either as a
tax upon the property from which the income is derived,9 or as a tax on
the income itself as a specie of property.1o But the closest analogy which
can be drawn between an income tax and any of the other types of taxation
is between it and an excise tax.1 1 A practical definition of an excise tax is
that it is a tax on an act.1 2 The same author then suggests regarding an
income tax as an excise upon the act of earning or receiving the income.13
This accords with the result in the principal case, wherein it was said, "We
conclude that the tax in question is an excise, levied upon those domiciled
within the state, upon the privilege of domicile or the privilege of transacting
business within the state 0 * 0 "14 In view of the conflicting character-
istics of an income tax, the court might have followed Professor Brown and
the Wisconsin courts 1 5 in deeming such tax to be su generis. But the
important fact is that it is not a property tax, whatever else it may be. This
position Chief Justice Fansler supports with abundant authority and reason.
"It is a tax on the recipient of income, the tax being upon the right or
ability to produce, create, receive, and enjoy, and not upon specific property."lo
Having denominated the Indiana tax as an excise tax and thus not within
the "uniform and equal" limitation of Art. 10, sec. 1 of the Indiana Con-
stitution, it was then incumbent upon the court to specify against what legal
capacities the tax is assessed. Herein lies the distinction between the opinion
written in January, 1935,17 and the present one. In the earlier opinion, the
court concluded that the tax was "levied upon those domiciled within the
state upon the basis of the privilege of domicile * 0 0,"18 Although a
tax on the "basis -of the privilege of domicile" implies that the privileges
which are incidental to domicile are those which are being taxed, yet the
opinion on rehearing evidently wishes to make it clear that this is so, and
that it is not the privilege of domicile itself which is being taxed. The latter
would obviously be contrary to the "privileges and immunities" clause of the
7Brown, Nature of the Income Tax, 17 Minn. L. R. 127 discusses the
income tax under the three general tax classifications of (1) capitation taxes,
(2) property taxes, and (3) excise taxes. Cooley, Taxation, (4th ed.) vol.
1, sec. 38.
8 Cook v. Tait (1924), 265 U. S. 4-7.
9Pollack v. Farmers L. & T. Co. (1895), 157 U. S. 429, on rehearing 158
U. S. 601, Opinion of the Justices (1915), 220 Mass. 613, 108 N. E. 570;
Maguire v. Tefry (1920), 253 U. S. 12.
10 Eliasbery Bros. v. Grimes (1920), 204 Ala. 492, 86 So. 561, State v.
Pinder (1919), 30 Del. 416, 108' Ad. 43, New Orleans v. Fourchy (1878),
30 La. Ann. 910; Alderman v. Wells (1910), 85 S. C. 507, 67 S. E. 781.
11 Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v. Robertson (1921), 126 Miss. 34, 52, 88 So.
4, 5, Sims v. Ahrens (1925), 167 Ark. 557, 271 S. W 720.
12 Brown, Nature of the Income Tax, 17 Minn. L. R. 127, 139.
13 Brown, Nature of the Income Tax, 17 Minn. L. R. 127, 139.
14 Miles v. Department of Treasury (1935), 199 N. E. 372, 378.
15 State v. Frear (1912), 148 Wis. 456, 134 N. W 673, State v. Tax Com-
mission (1915), 161 Wis. 111, 152 N. W 848.
10Miles v. Department of Treasury (1935), 199 N. E. 372, 377, 6 Minn.
L. R. 255.
17 Miles v. Department of Treasury (1935), 193 N. E. 855 (Ind. Sup.).
18Miles v. Department of Treasury (1935), 193 N. E. 855, 861.
RECENT CASE NOTES
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution. 1 9 But the instant opinion
emphasizes that the tax is upon the privileges and protection incident to
domicile or activities in the state and not upon the privilege of domicile. As
such, it falls clearly within a class of taxes which have always been con-
sidered within the taxing powers of the state. 2 0 The fact that it is measured
by gross receipts or income of the taxpayer does not affect its validity unless
it is unreasonable. 2 1
The remaining question discussed by the court involves appellants' con-
tention that the graduation of the tax and the various exemptions from com-
putation of gross recelpts2 2 amounted to a denial of the equal protection of
the laws. In answer, the court quotes from Board of Commissioners vi.
Johnson2 3 the stock reply to assertions of denial of equal protection, "If all
persons who are in like circumstances, or affected alike, are treated under
the laws the same, there is no deprivation of the equal protection of the
laws." It is usually stated that this is limited only by the rule of reasonable-
ness in that classifications for tax purposes must not be capricious or arbi-
trary, but must rest upon some reasonable distinction. 2 4 In view of classifica-
tions which have been recently sustained, 2 5 it is not at all difficult to find
reasonableness in the graduation and the comparatively minor exemptions in
the act.
It is submitted that the holdings of the principal case that the Indiana
Gross Income Tax is not a property tax is thus not limited by the application
of the "uniform and equal" clause of the state constitution, and that the tax
does not make such classifications as to amount to a denial of the equal
protection of the law, are in accord with most modern authority. H. A. A.
19Willis, Constitutional Law of the United States (1936), p. 192, 193,
Slaughter House Cases (1872), 16 Wall. 36.
20 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed.), vol. 4, sec. 1672; Lawrence v. Tax Com-
missioners (1932), 286 U. S. 276.
21 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed.), vol. 4, sec. 1692; Waits, Gross Income Tax
and General Sales Taxes as a Substitute for State Valorem Taxes, 6 Miss.
L. J. 217.
The use of gross income taxes by state governments has raised the in-
creasingly practical question of the possibilities of its use by the federal
government. Is the word "incomes" in the Sixteenth Amendment limited to
net incomes, or can it include gross receipts within its scope? If the latter
is true, there is nothing to prevent the use of the Sixteenth Amendment for
that purpose. But if the word is not so construed, there are still the state
decisions holding such taxes to be excise taxes, which if accepted by the
federal courts, would again place it within the taxing powers of the federal
government, unhampered by the rule of apportionment. For a discussion of
this question and exhaustive citations, see 36 Col. L. R. 274.
22 See Burns' Ann. St. 1933 sec. 64-2606, 64-2607, and 64-2601 (f), (g),
and (h).
23 (1909) 173 Ind. 76, 89 N. E. 590; Cooley, Taxation (4th ed.), vol. 1,
p. 533.
24 State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson (1931), 283 U. S. 527,
Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. People of Illinois (1934), 292 U. S. 535, Bordens
Farm Products v. Baldwin (1934), 293 U. S. 194.
25 State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson (1931), 283 U. S. 527,
Puget Sound P & L. Co. v. Seattle (1934), 291 U. S. 619; Union Bank &
Trust Co. v. Phelps (1933), 288 U. S. 181, Developments in the Law- Taxa-
tion-1933, 47 Harv. L. R. 1209, 1226.
